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Libyan writer Dr. El-Hadi Shallouf


د. الهادي شلوف

Saturday, 25 April, 2009

GAZA ATTACKS IN  INTERNATIONAL LAW & INTERNATIONAL  CRIMINAL LAW

Dr. El-Hadi Shalluf

Papers presented  to the International  conference  of  the Prosecutors   

of the   Islamic  Countries in Association with  International  Jurists

in Teheran Iran  21-22 and   April 2009 

BY : Prof. Dr.  Hadi SHALLUF,

Hold  Ph.D. in Criminal Law and Criminology (Italy) and  a  Doctorate d’Etat in International Law and International Relations (France)

Post-Doctorate : Common Study Programme on Criminal Justice  and Critical Criminology Programme  under the  Responsibility of European Commission  and  the  United Nations Social Defence  Research Institute ( UNSDRI )  with Universities of :  University of Rotterdam Erasmus ,  NL . University  of  Bologna  , Italy ,  University of  Saarland of Saarbrûken , Germany

Member of International Criminal Court (ICC), appointed by the ICC  in Darfur Case 2006-2007

Is Professor of  Law  , Comparative Criminal Law  and Criminal  Procedures   - International  Criminal  Law

Paris Bar Member since 1989-  International Lawyer

President of  The Association of Jurists and Lawyers Euro-Arabs . AJLEA- AJAEA

E-mail; shallufhadi@yahoo.com

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                GAZA  ATTACKS    IN  INTERNATIONAL  LAW   &    

                          INTERNATIONAL  CRIMINAL  LAW

    Israel , European  Union,  United Stats of America, declared  that Israel has  the right to  attack Gaza  as self-Defence *

-   The absence of any reaction of the Security council  of the United  Nations  UNSC, about Gaza attacking **

 -  International criminal justice, the International Criminal Court (ICC) and  Gaza Situation  or Gaza  case

 Here we will  do some short analyses  about this matter  in regarding  the International  Law and International Criminal law

 Israeli  has  no right   to   self-defence, specially  GAZA        

               occupied territory  by Israel it self  

 Self-defence: A   State  of  Mind   of  States  

 The  rule  concerning  the prohibition    of the  threat  or  use  of  force has been the object  of controversy  since  the  early  days  of its  articulation in article 2(4)  of the UN Charter

 The right of  self-defence expressly stipulated  in article 51 of  the  UN Charter.  State practice  following  the adoption of the Charter is marked  by numerous  instance  of  resort  to armed force

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 The proliferation  of  the use of force appears to suggest  a prima  facie  disregard  to prohibition , the inadequacy of its preventive  force or, even, its

 insignificance in “ real world” international  relations. However, states  have always taken  pains at justifying resort to  force as lawful by  reference  to one

  of  the  exceptions  to  prohibition.  In the Nicaragua (Merits) case  at  the International Justice Court  ICJ   “ case concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities  in  and  against Nicaragua (Nicaragua  v  USA, merits, ICL Rep. 1986- p 14 at p 98, para.186)”  :

   (In order to deduce  the existence  of  customary rules, the Court deems it sufficient that the conduct of States should, in general, be consistent with such  rules  and that instance of State  conduct inconsistent  with  a  given rule should  generally  have been treated  as   breaches of that  rule, not  as indications  of  the recognition of  a new rule. If a State  acts  in a way prima facie incompatible  with  a recognized  rule, but it defends its  conduct by appealing to exceptions  or justifications contained  within  the rule itself, than  whether or not the State’s  conduct it in fact justifiable on  that  basis, the significance of that  attitude is  to  confirm rather  than  weaken the rule)

 The  11 September 2001 event  have  shown  that  group of  private armed individual, who do not  belong  to a State  apparatus, are capable of unleashing violence of great scale and catastrophic effect. However, the use of force by private individuals is  not novel, nor is  the identification of an armed   group as “ terrorist”  ( see  Brownlie, Principles  of  Public International Law, 6th edn. Oxford University  press 2003 p. 713)  .

  What has been novel  is the  response to such  action under the nebulous  concept of “ war against terrorism”  which includes , but  is not limited to, the use  of force under the invocation of  self-defence  ( see  Ch. Gray , International  Law and the Use of  Force . 2nd edn Oxford University press  2004 pp. 159 et  seq)  . It  is argued that  terrorist  activity constitutes autonomously  an “ armed attack”  that  gives  rise  to  the right of resort to force in self-defence by the victim-state  of  such activity. In other words the  use of force in self-defence against  actors that do not constitute  states and irrespective  of  the specific degree in involvement  of another  stat in their activities  ( see  Abi Saab, Introduction –the proper Role  of International Law in Combating Terrorism, Oxford  Hart publication  2004  and see  Y. Dinstein ; War  Aggression and self-defence  4th edn Cambridge University pp. 201-2008, see also   J.Paust  The  Ie of Armed  Force Against  Terrorists in Afghanistan , and  Iraq .35 Cornell JIL 2002  p.534) .Thus, the perceived necessity to counter terrorism  by way of defensive force appears to cast doubt on the inter-state context of regulation of  the use of force in international law. The  authorization by  the Security Council under  Chapters VII and VIII  of the Charter , concern the legitimization of  resort to

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force by a state,  without specifying  expressly that the target of  lawful force must always be a state. Chapter VII  action authorized  by Security  Council

  may be directed against  non stat entities, e.g  , the action  authorized  by the Security Council against the Bosnian Serbs , and UNITA organization in Angola . However, the situation with respect to the target of the exercise of self-defnce is not clear .

a)     the self-defnce should be only  between  States  not  against armed groups or occupied people

 The  international  law governing self-defence is  notoriously  controversial . Since the inception of the United  Nations  in 1945, numerous bothersome   issues as to the scope, nature and content of right have continued  to plague  states and scholars  alike. For   example , in recent years  , the long-standing debate over whether Article 51 of the UN Charter  allows for  self –defence  in response  to  a threat-rather than an actual use – of  force  has bee given  a thorough  dusting of  following the 9/11 event  war on terror . The flames of this  debate  were fanned most notably  by the controversial  Bush Doctrine of pre-emptive self-defnce 

The  statement of the International Court of Justice ICJ   in 2004 “ that self-defnce  requires an attack  by one State against  another State   “  this is the opinion of  International Court of Justice,  and  the legal consequences of the construction of a Wall in the  Occupied Palestinian Territory advisory opinion  of ICJ  Rep 2004, p. 135 para 139    

b)    Self-defence  and  armed reprisals 

A distinction has  often  been drawn,  particularly  in the UN  era,  between two  categories of  forcible  response.

First , one can identify  military  actions taken in self-defence  . These  constitute lawful   forcible  responses , despite  the  fact that they  constitute a prime  facie  breach  of  the   prohibition  on the  use  of force  contained  in article 2(4) of  the  UN  Charter. 

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 Such  lawful   self-defence   actions can  then be  distinguished  from  what are  termed “ Armed reprisals”  . Like  self-defence actions armed   reprisals  are  forcible  responses  to  a prior  breach  of an international legal obligation  owed  to  the  responding state.

 It is clear  that an action must  be  a response to  a prior  delicat to be considered  an armed reprisals  ( see  M.J. Kelly , time warp to 1945 : Resurrection of Reprisals and  Anticipatory  Self-Defence Doctrine  in  International Law – 2003-2004 )

 However, in contrast  to a response taken in self-defence , there has been general  and  continued  agreement  throughout the UN era  that the type  of unilateral  forcible  response termed an “ armed reprisals”  constitutes    as   breach of  international law

 Under  the Charter of United Nations , the  use of force  by  way  of  reprisals  is illegal ( see  R. Barasotti – Armed Reprisals , in A.Casses ed.. The  Current Legal Regulation of the Use  of Force  1972)

 More   recently , with   regard to  the  “war on terror”  the universal agreement  that  reprisals  are not  lawful

Since  the  adoption  of the UN Charter  , the armed  reprisals  have been explicitly and  repeatedly  condemned  as  being unlawful in state practice.

 A classic example of such condemnation  is  a passage  from  the 1970  UN  Declaration on  Principles  of International Law concerning  Friendly Co—operation  among  States, which  expressly hold  “States haves  a duty   to refrain  from  acts  of   reprisal involving  the use of the force  ( see  the UN declaration on Principles  of International law  concerning  Friendly among Stats  Co-operation  1972, GA Res 2625 –XXXV , and see  also  the Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention and Interference in the Internal affaires of Stats 1981, GA Res 36/103, which  provides   that  states  are obligated  to “ refrain from armed intervention … including  acts  of  reprisal   involving the use of force”)

 In  context  of  Security Council practice, several  resolutions have labeled  armed  reprisals  as unlawful  , either explicitly or implicitly .

 The most  quoted  example of   this  is Security Council resolution 188, in relation to British  aerial attacks  against  Yemen 1964. The resolution explicitly  condemned  reprisals  as incompatible  with the principles  and purposes of the UN  Charter

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Fundamentally , the conclusion that armed reprisals  are  unlawful  stems  directly  from  the  fact that the UN Charter prohibits   the use of force under article 2(4)    

The  only  lawful exception to tis outside of the  framework of UN use of force  is  self-defence  under Article 51.  Therefore   a unilateral use of force  that is not a Self-defnce action must be prohibited. ( see Levenfeld – Israel’s Counter- Fedayeen  Tactics in Lebanon: self-defence and reprisal under modern  international law  1982-1983)

 It is very  clear  that in the context of the jus ad bellum  , one  may  distinguished self-defence ( which is  a lawful military response to an  international delict)   and  the Reprisals, ( which are unlawful forcible responses  to an international delict)

However , whilst actions  of armed  reprisals  have been repeatedly  condemned  in stat  practice as being unlawful, it  is unclear from such  condemnations what  armed reprisals  actually   constitutes? . 

The resolutions of UN  bodies that have condemned armed  reprisals  but  do not  set  out that term means 

The question than ,  is what in fact  distinguishes  an unlawful armed reprisal from a lawful  self-defence action?

 It is of little  use   to have universal  agreement as o the lawful nature of armed reprisals   if it is  not clear as to what  such actions actually  amount  to, and why they are not seen as being distinct from  self-defnce actions

 Maybe  before attempting to answer this  question , two points of  clarification must  made as to what is  being discussed  in the  context , first   it possible to envisage a situation  where an armed reprisal  could be taken in response  to non-forcible  breach  of a prior  obligation. I, other word, if stat A  breached a trade obligation owed to stat B, and  state B responded to this with military force, that response could be termed  and armed reprisal.

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The distinction  between a self-defnce action and  this kind of armed reprisal is   clear  self-defence  can only be taken  in response to an actual use  of force  ( see J. Combacau  “ the exception of self-defnce in UN practice  Paris ed 2007 ) 

In conclusion, the war against Gaza  that  not just only war  against civil people but also  occupied people

 Israel has  committed crimes  and violated the international law  and human rights  

c)     The attacking  state:   specific intent  as  a requirement for  armed attack

 In  addition on the  notion  that  the  subjective of  a state responding in self-defence may influence the lawfulness of their action ( distinguishing  self-defence  from armed  reprisals) , it   has been suggested ,  notably in  the jurisprudence of the  ICJ, that a degree  of intent on  the part of the attacking  stat must be established before a response may be  taken.  As we have seen the ICJ appeared  to  suggest - at  the least implicitly – in  Nicaragua and in oil platforms, that  underling  motivation behind  a response  taken in  self-defence  should not be taken  into  account  when  determining  whether  that response was lawful ( see  Boston college international & comparative law Rev  1981 p 61 -726  IN AN INTERVIEW WITH THE Security of Defence  at that  time  J.R.Schlesinger, it was certainly indicated  that  the motives  of the United States were more  the  simply defensive). However , in   few  telling  passages, it seems  that  the ICJ, has reached in  inverse conclusion  with regard  of the intention   of attacking  state. 

Specifically the  Court    has  indicated  that  the  intention of  the attacking state  is relevant  to the question  of whether an  armed attack has  occurred, such  a suggestion is  rather  unique. 

The implication of  the  International Court for Justice, ICJ , is  that  for an attack  to qualify  as an  “armed  attack”, it must not only be  qualitatively   grave , but  must  be  intended .  there  are  two possible  ways  in which         “ intention” could  be applied  to an action  ostensibly  constituting  an armed attack. 

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 The first  is that the attack must  have  been intentionally  directed  against the state invoking self-defence  ( or the state  upon  whose  behalf the  invoking  state claims  to be acting collectively ).  This is  roughly  equivalent to  the  idea of “ specific intent “  in the  domestic  law of  a  number  of  states ( see  Law Rev. 1979-1980  - W. Roth “ general vs  Specific intent  a time  for terminological  understanding -  the term  is often employed for example , in  the United States , particularly  in relation  to criminal law ) . The   second  is  a wider  criterion  ;  the action  must  have been an “ intentional” one generally . Here the perpetrator must  have  some   intent to  perform the action at all, in other  words  to direct  it  against anyone;  this  may  be termed “ general  intent”  . The “ intention” requirement  alluded to by  the  ICJ   appears to be the   former “ specific intent” version. In other words  we are  not  considering whether  the  action  was  deliberate, but  rather whether it was  deliberately directed  at  the  responding  state . 

The question for  the ICJ , it seems very  clear, is  whether  the  attacking state “ meant” to  attack  the responding state. This can  be best illustrated  by the  2003  judgment in the Oil  Platforms case  

In   the  context of  the  first set  of United States attacks against  the Iranian  platforms , paragraph  64  of  the Oil Platforms  judgment read  / 

“ The Court notes first  that  Isle City [ a  vessel flagged  by  the United  States]  was in Kuwaiti  water  at  the time  of the  attack on it , and  that a Silkworm  missile fired  from  ( it  is  alleged)  more  than  100kl  away   could  not  have  been aimed at the specific vessel , but  simply programmed to hit some  target in Kuwaiti waters . Secondly, the Texaco  Caribbean , whatever it is ownership , was flying a United States flag, so that an attack on vessel is not  itself to be equated with an attack  on  that State…. There is no  evidence  that  the mine  laying alleged  to have  been  carried out   by  the  Iran Ajr ,  at  a time  when Iran was at war with Iraq, was  aimed  specifically  at he United States; and  similarly it has not been established  that the  mine struck  by the Bridgestone [    a vessel  flagged  by the United States]  was laid with  the specific intention of harming that ship or  other  United States” 

Thus, in Oil Platforms, the International  Court for Justice  ICJ   repeatedly indicated  that United States failed to prove  that the incidents alleged of Iran were intended  to harm the United State. 

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In a similar vein, the  Nicaragua  merits  decision of  1986 , the Court clearly indicated  that it  saw the motive behind an attack as being relative  to  question of whether  that  attack constituted  an  armed attack ; 

“ see  the opinion of  judge Schweble -  Turning  to Honduras and Costa Rica.. certain  transborder  incursions into  the  territory  of those two  States, in, 1982, 1983 and 1984 , were  imputable to  the  Government of Nicaragua q; Very  little information  is however available to the Court “IJC”  as to  the  circumstances of these incursions or their possible motivations, which renders it  difficult to  decide whether they  may  be treated for legal purposes as amounting singly or collectively, to  an armed attack  by Nicaragua on either or both States “  

Certainly  the Oil Platforms decision  indicates that the International Court of justice  believed  that  the specific intent of perpetrator  was relevant to the  determination of  an armed attack. Indeed, it has  been argued that  the International Court of Justice  put  this  forward as a determinative requirement  for  lawful  self-defence (see  N. Ochoa-Ruiz and E. Salamanca-Aguado Exploring the limits  of international law relating to the Use of Force  in self-defence -16 EJIL 2005 P 499 at P 514 )  

Here  we can see that  the International  Court of Justice  ICJ  position in Oil Platforms   suggests  that “ indiscriminate” attacks or attacks directed  at a state other than  the responding states , are unlikely  to give  rise  to  the  right of self-defence  ( see  D. Kritsiotis  “ Rules on self-defence in international Law , Memorandum  for the Royal Institute of international Affaires, London Chatham House International Law Programme 8 December  2004 p 11)   

International Criminal Justice and Gaza 

a)     universal jurisdiction  

First , I think before  we  talking about  the permanent   International  Criminal Court  ICC , we  should  trying to  looking to the Universal Jurisdiction over  International  Crimes, 

Universal jurisdiction is exercised  over  the relevant crimes  in the absence  of the  connection point between  the crime  and the  forum   state . 

It  is generally  acknowledged that  such universal  jurisdiction currently exists over war crimes, crimes against humanity, torture  and  genocide.  

The 2005  Resolution of  the Institute of International Law perceives universal   jurisdiction as  the primary tool to combating  international crimes . As  the  Preamble  of  the Resolution states, the primary responsibility  with combating  theses  crimes  lies with individual  states.  The  Preamble  proceeds  to affirm  that  “ universal jurisdiction is an additional effective  means to  prevent impunity for  international  crimes “  

This is mean  the competence  of  a state to prosecute alleged offenders and  to punish   them  if  convicted , irrespective  of  the place of  commission of the  crimes  and  regardless  of any link of active or passive   nationality, or  other  ground  of  jurisdiction  recognized  by international  law. Most significantly , Article  2 affirms that universal  jurisdiction  is primarily  based  on customary  international  law .  The following articles specify  the  crimes to  which universal jurisdiction applies . 

In England  , the Case of  Pinochet , clarified that   universal jurisdiction is available in case of breaches of jus cogens  , having demonstrated the  clear link  between  the two  notions  . The  decision of Australian Supreme  Court in Polyukovich  also  suggests  that  universal jurisdiction “ is  based on the  notion  tat  certain acts are o universally  condemned that , regardless  of  the  situs  of  the offence   and the nationality of the offender or the vistim, each  stat has  jurisdiction to deal  with  perpetrators of  those  acts  ( see  Toohey J. Polyukhovich v  Commonwealth 91 ILR P. 118 ) Nulyarimma  affirms  that  the customary   jus  cogens  crime  of  genocide empowers all  states  to exercise jurisdiction over it  ( see  Nulyarimma  165  Australian law Reports  p;  621  at  pp 632 )  

Universal  jurisdiction as  one of  the important  sources of International Criminal Court   

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This , “universal jurisdiction” has  been the legal  position  since at least 1948, until  the creation  of International tribunal for former Yugoslavian ICTY  to  prosecution of crimes committed  on  the  former Yugoslav  territory in the 90s  

Gaza attack, could be prosecuted   before  the  nationals jurisdictions en application of the  universal jurisdiction 

b)    Globalization of the International Criminal Justice and  the creation of  ad hoc tribunals by The United Nations , Security  council   

human societies across the globe have established progressively closer contact over many centuries, but  recently the pace has dramatically increased, today  we are  witnesses of the developing of  communication , transportation net, computers etc and cultures circulate more freely . As a result Laws, economies  and social movements are forming at the international level Justice it is no more local , it is  becoming global  . As evidence of what  we call today “ globalization of  justice “ in development of  the concept of individual the individual  responsibility  and the  creation  of  ad hoc  tribunals  for former Yugoslavia (ICTY)  and Rwanda (ICTR) , special tribunal for  Sierra Leone , Special Tribunal for Cambodia, Ad-Hoc Court for East Timor, Special Tribunal for Lebanon, the expanding use of universal jurisdiction in domestic courts  and the very important the  creation of  the permanent  International Criminal Court  (ICC) 

we  could  saying that  the  key to  understanding  how   penalties  are  imposed  for  war  crimes  and  crimes  against humanity   under  International  tribunal for   prosecution of persons  responsible for   serious  violation of    international  laws  , international humanitarian  law   committed    for example   in the territory  of the   former Yugoslavia,  ICTY ,  

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 in the  context in which  the tribunal   was  established ,  in effect, the  first  international criminal  tribunal  o be established  by international  community  since  the  trial  of Nuremberg  and Tokyo   “ the  post-world  war II, prosecution  particularly   the  international military tribunal for   Far East at Tokyo (IMTEFE) constitute  a major  historic  development  I  the  establishment  of individual   criminal  responsibility under international law”   heads  of states  were    no longer  given  immunity  ( precedented  only by  article 227  of the 1919  Treaty   of  Versailles Which defined  the  crimes  for  which the Kaiser  of  Germany  was to stand  trial)    

this establishment  of ICTY  , coming after  50 years  of  dormancy  has therefore,  meant  that it has basically  had to  start  from  scratch  in  its  quest to  hold accountable those  individuals  who  committed   gross human  right  violation in  the course of the  armed  conflict in   Former  Yugoslavia  

 the  sentencing  of individuals  for  war crimes  and crimes against humanity   I think  the new   step  to  the international Criminal law ( see Olaoluwa Olusanya  “  Sentencing War Crimes  and Crimes against humanity  under  the ICTY -  Europe law Publishing  2005- pp  4 ) 

I can say  that  on 25 may 1993, the UN  Security Council  took  the extraordinary  and  unprecedented step  of deciding  to  establish  the International  Criminal  for  the  former  Yugoslavia  ICTY as  a  mechanism  for  the restoration  and maintenance  of  international  peace and security 

 Resolution 827 ,  was an extremely  significant  innovation in the  use  of  mandatory   enforcement  powers  by  the Security Council , and  the manifestation  of an explicit  link  between peace  and justice, politics  and law 

But   we have not forget that,   the creation or establishment  , ad hoc  tribunals  for former Yugoslavia (ICTY) Rwanda (ICTR) , special tribunal for  Sierra Leone , Special Tribunal for Cambodia,   and Ad-Hoc Court for East Timor,  and  Special Tribunal for Lebanon  was  the  result  of a political   decision to activate  the  legal  power  and  authority of  Security Council  to  enforce  another  set  of international  laws-Those  regulating  the use  of force- by  creating  a  judicial  institutions with  a political  mandate,  

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Here I could say  that  State  and Individual criminal  responsibility  under  international criminal law are not the same  thing.  

For instance, for and individual to be  held  criminally  liable  for  an act  of  genocide  under  international  law,  and  would have  to be prosecuted  and punished  by  an  international  criminal  tribunals , or by international criminal court   applying  an  international  criminal   statute  

In the  case  of State  responsibility, contemporary  international law only  permits  one   State to  demand  that  the State  committing  genocide  cease  and  desist from  committing  genocide  against   nationals  of   the  victim  State; wipe  out  the  consequences  of genocide and  restore  the  situations  existing  before  the genocide;  and  provide  to  the  victim State ,in  its  own  right  and as   parens patriae  for  it is  citizens, compensation  for the  damage  and losses   caused  by  another State committing  genocide  against  the  nationals  of  the  victims State 

In conclusion : Gaza attacks, could be prosecuted   before  a special International  Criminal Tribunal, this Tribunal   should be established by  the UN  Security  Council as  ICTY, and  ICTR.

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c)     International  criminal court  ICC, and  Gaza  case   

On 17 July 1998  , the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court was  adopted , 108 countries  ratified   this Statute  

The Rome Statute stipules in   articles 12 and 13  the  Preconditions of  the exercise of  jurisdiction , and  who’s has  the right to exercise

Article 12 

Preconditions to the exercise of jurisdiction

 
1.         A State which becomes a Party to this Statute thereby accepts the jurisdiction of the Court with respect to the crimes referred to in article 5.
 
2.         In the case of article 13, paragraph (a) or (c), the Court may exercise its jurisdiction if one or more of the following States are Parties to this Statute or have accepted the jurisdiction of the Court in accordance with paragraph 3:  

(a)     The State on the territory of which the conduct in question occurred or, if the crime was committed on board a vessel or aircraft, the State of registration of that vessel or aircraft;

(b)     The State of which the person accused of the crime is a national.

3.         If the acceptance of a State which is not a Party to this Statute is required under paragraph 2, that State may, by declaration lodged with the Registrar, accept the exercise of jurisdiction by the Court with respect to the crime in question. The accepting State shall cooperate with the Court without any delay or exception in accordance with Part 9.  

Article 13 

Exercise of jurisdiction

 
            The Court may exercise its jurisdiction with respect to a crime referred to in article 5 in accordance with the provisions of this Statute if:

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(a)     A situation in which one or more of such crimes appears to have been committed is referred to the Prosecutor by a State Party in accordance with article 14;

(b)     A situation in which one or more of such crimes appears to have been committed is referred to the Prosecutor by the Security Council acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations; or

(c)     The Prosecutor has initiated an investigation in respect of such a crime in accordance with article 15. 

Article 13,  is very clear   the  cases or situations  could not be  refereed to ICC  just  only  :

 1- if the  case or situation  referred  to the Prosecutor  by the  one or more  of States party  of the Statute , that mean ratified the Statute of  Rome  and becoming   member  and  part of the Assembly of States  party  (Referral of a situation by a State Party) 

2- if  the case  or situation  referred to  the Prosecutor  by  the Security Council acting under the Chapter VII of  the Charter  of the United Nations. The example of this right  the Darfur situation  , which  referred to the Prosecutor of the ICC  by Security Council  resolution n°  1593 (2005) of 31 March 2005  (Referral of a situation or case  by the United Nations Security Council  ) 

3- if the Prosecutor of the ICC, has  initiated by him self proprio motu an investigation on the  basis  of information on crimes within the  jurisdiction of the  ICC  in application of article 12 of Rome Statute , that mean:

-   the Prosecutor  can not  make  investigation only concerning  a State  which  becomes  a party   of the Rome Statute, see  the Iraq  Case  and the answer of Prosecutor, were  he declared that he  has  no  competence on  the crimes committed in Iraq, because it  no  a member of the Rome Statute, 

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-  and only crimes committed   after  the a  state   becomes  a member  of the Statute of Rome  see the case of Venezuela , the prosecutor  reused to do any investigation on crimes committed  in Venezuela   before  it becomes  a member of  Rome Statute ,  before  ratification de Statute  

In conclusions  that ICC can  not prosecute Israeli leaders  for Gaza  attacks and crimes committed  if  there is no  resolution  from UNSC  to reefer the   situation  of  Gaza Attacks  

d) Security  Council  and Gaza Attacks  

To prosecute Israelis  leaders, the international law should be  exercised  in application of  chapter VII of the United Nations charter as Darfur case Resolution 1593 (2005) or  the creation of  special international  criminal tribunal   for Gaza   as the  establishment of  ad hoc  tribunals  for former Yugoslavia (ICTY) Rwanda (ICTR) , special tribunal for  Sierra Leone , Special Tribunal for Cambodia,   and Ad-Hoc Court for East Timor,  and  Special Tribunal for Lebanon   

But the real question here  who’s control  the Security Council  and has the right of  to exercise  the right  of veto to abortion any  resolution ?  

The use of the right of veto by only  a permanent member of the Security Council ,  The UNSC veto system was formalized at the Yalta Conference      4-11 February 1945 

It was   established in order to prohibit the UN from taking any future action directly against its principal founding members  and alies  or frieds

By the  creation of United Nations Charter in San Fransisco , June 26 ,1945 , the aricle 27  give the right  of  veto to  only  5 countries , France, UK, USA, Russia  and China  

The United States and  allies  France  and United Kingdom   was abortion more than  36 times in 41 years, all resolutions  projects concerning  the occupied Palestinian   against  Israel  

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In Gaza attacks, US blocks all the time UN Security Council to take any action on Gaza or about Palsetienan  situation  

I should  say The United States even  blocked approval of a UN Security Council statement calling for an immediate cease-fire between Israel and Hamas and expressing serious concern at the escalation of violence following Israel’s ground attack in Gaza  and  U.S. abstains, even  when the  U.N. Security Council Calls for Cease-fire on Jan. 8  2009  and  adopted a resolution calling for a cease-fire in the Gaza Strip,  “  the 15-nation council adopted the resolution by a vote of 14 to 0.former Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice cast the sole abstention but said the United States supports the text and objectives of the resolution”. 

In conclusions , the ICC, can  not be able  to exercise  jurisdiction  to the Gaza Attacks with out  resolution should be  adopted  by UNSC in acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, to referral  the Gaza case to the ICC as Darfur case in adoption the Resolution 1593 (2005) of 31 March 2005 (in acting in application of articles 13 and 16 of the Rome Statute and of  the agreements    “ between ICC and UNSC” referred to in Article 98-2 of the Rome Statute) . 

For that  reason , I think  that  the best  way  we need to asking for international  justice to Gaza ,  by the way we  should  Appling for   the  creation of one  Special  International Tribunal for GAZA. 

That Tribunal   will  be a similar of  the creation and establishment,  of ad hoc  tribunals  by  the  UNSC resolutions, like  Tribunals,  for  former Yugoslavia (ICTY) Rwanda (ICTR) , Special Tribunal for  Sierra Leone , Special Tribunal for Cambodia,   and Ad-Hoc Court for East Timor,  and  Special Tribunal for Lebanon

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We  should ask, The International Community ,  the UNSC for one resolution to  establishment  an  International  Tribunal for Gaza ,  it will be  named, the  Special International Tribunal for Gaza . 

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  • *    Why no  EU and no  USA  Critics of Gaza Attacks ? article written  by David Cronin
  • ** Mohammad Khazaei Iran's ambassador to the UN told the UN Security Council meeting on  25th march 2009  that the international body, including the UN and the Security Council, had to take 'immediate' action against what Tehran defines as Israel's crimes against Palestinians
  • Human Rights Watch (HRW) said in a 71-page report titled "Rain of Fire" published on 25th march 2009 that Israel's repeated use of white phosphorus in densely-populated areas was not accidental but revealed "a pattern or policy of conduct."
  • On 12 January 2009, the Human Rights Council adopted a resolution on the human rights situation in the Gaza strip. The Resolution is entitled “The Grave Violations of Human Rights in the Occupied Palestinian Territory particularly due to the recent Israeli military attacks against the occupied Gaza Strip”. The Resolution was adopted by 33 votes, mainly from the African and Asian continents. Thirteen members, including the EU members of the Council, abstained; only Canada voted against the Resolution. The United States is currently not a member of the Human Rights Council. (A/HRC/S-9/2 of 27 January 2009)
  • Richard Goldstone, the South African judge who was chief prosecutor for war crimes tribunals for Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia, was selected by the UN Human Rights Council to investigate allegations that Israel violated international laws in its assault on Gaza. The Human Rights Council is a body of nations not controlled by either the UN secretary general or the UN's high commissioner for human rights.
  • What the Geneva convention says ? preventing care constitutes a serious violation of the laws of war. Article 17 of the fourth Geneva convention clearly states that “the parties to the conflict shall endeavour to conclude local agreements for the removal from besieged or encircled areas, of wounded, sick, infirm, and aged persons, and for the passage of ministers of all religions, medical personnel and medical equipment on their way to such areas”. The fourth convention also says hospitals should “at all time be respected and protected” by parties at war

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